Energy Security Concerns versus Market Harmony: The Europeanisation of Capacity Mechanisms by Leiren, Merethe Dotterud et al.
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 92–104
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i1.1791
Article
Energy Security Concerns versus Market Harmony: The Europeanisation
of Capacity Mechanisms
Merethe Dotterud Leiren 1,*, Kacper Szulecki 2, Tim Rayner 3 and Catherine Banet 4
1 CICERO Center for International Climate Research, 0349 Oslo, Norway; E-Mail: merethe.leiren@cicero.oslo.no
2 Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, 0851 Oslo, Norway; E-Mail: kacper.szulecki@stv.uio.no
3 Tyndall Centre for ClimateChangeResearch,University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR47TJ, UK; E-Mail: tim.rayner@uea.ac.uk
4 Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, University of Oslo, 0162 Oslo, Norway; E-Mail: catherine.banet@jus.uio.no
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 21 October 2018 | Accepted: 7 December 2018 | Published: 28 March 2019
Abstract
The impact of renewables on the energy markets–falling wholesale electricity prices and lower investment stability–are
apparently creating a shortage of energy project financing, which in future could lead to power supply shortages. Govern-
ments have responded by introducing payments for capacity, alongside payments for energy being sold. The increasing
use of capacity mechanisms (CMs) in the EU has created tensions between the European Commission, which encour-
ages cross-country cooperation, and Member States that favour backup solutions such as capacity markets and strategic
reserves. We seek to trace the influence of the European Commission on national capacity markets as well as learning
between Member States. Focusing on the United Kingdom, France and Poland, the analysis shows that energy security
concerns have been given more emphasis than the functioning of markets by Member States. Policy developments have
primarily been domestically driven, but the European Commission has managed to impose certain elements, most im-
portantly a uniform methodology to assess future supply security, as well as specific requirements for national capacity
markets: interconnectors to neighbouring countries, demand side responses and continuous revision of CMs. Learning
from other Member States’ experiences also play a role in policy decisions.
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1. Introduction
Though a truly common European energy policy is still
lacking, the European Union has for years seen energy
market integration as an important goal, and the re-
alisation of Europe’s single market ideals in an impor-
tant economic sector. The introduction of the Third
Energy Package in 2009, which sought to further liber-
alise the internal electricity and gas markets, provided
the cornerstone for the implementation of the Internal
Energy Market (IEM)—a concept launched in 2014. Al-
though formally in place, the IEM still suffers from sig-
nificant problems. There is not enough physical connec-
tivity between national electricity grids to realise the
European Commission’s (Commission) vision of trading
electrons ‘from Lisbon to Helsinki and from Bucharest to
Dublin’ (Glachant, 2013, p. 122). There is also a clear ten-
sion between European-level governance and national
sovereignty over energy policy (Szulecki & Westphal,
2014). The IEM is governed by a myriad of national en-
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ergy regulations, leading to a fragmented landscape in
terms of energy mixes, strategies and policies.
Capacity mechanisms (CMs) constitute one policy
area where the Commission seeks to reduce such frag-
mentation. CMs offer additional rewards to energy
providers in return for maintaining existing capacity or
investing in new installations. Providers receive support
not only for electricity they sell, but also additional ser-
vices, most importantly the capacity they make available
when needed.While the Commission pushes in the direc-
tion of removing all market-distorting subsidies, a num-
ber of Member States have, since 1990, introduced in-
struments to address generation capacity and flexibility
adequacy concerns.
Increasing market shares for renewable energy make
capacity questions increasingly important. One visible ef-
fect of renewable electricity growth on European energy
markets is to lower average wholesale energy prices and
squeeze out conventional capacity. As renewables are
typically intermittent sources of electricity, researchers
argue that maintaining a certain level of conventional
capacity facilitates the integration of a high share of re-
newables in the energy system, by providing a stable
baseload and flexible backup in times of peak demand
(González-Diaz, 2015). This means that significant con-
ventional capacity stays ‘dormant’ for extended periods,
earning no revenue on an energy-only market (which
only pays for the electricity that is actually produced),
but ensuring system functioning in periods of tightening
supply. This state of affairs leads to the ‘missing money’
problem, as utilities have less funds to finance newcapac-
ity and keep existing plant online, and therefore do not
invest. However, there is no consensus that new capac-
ity and large amounts of conventional baseload are actu-
ally needed. Controversy occurs because energy security
and, more specifically, the security of electricity supply
can be framed in different ways: fuel adequacy, genera-
tion capacity adequacy, balancing and flexibility, as well
as network adequacy–all with the ultimate goal of unin-
terrupted, resilient supply at lowest possible cost (Cherp
& Jewell, 2014; Linklaters, 2014).
This means that overall resource adequacy in the
IEM can emphasise supply-side elements (generation
infrastructure), transmission (interconnectors) as well
as demand-side responses and energy efficiency. Im-
portantly, flexibility, demand-side responses, and cross-
border coordination contribute to system balancing,
while avoiding the risk of ‘carbon-lock-in’ which subsi-
dising conventional capacity arguably carries. Different
definitions and indicators of supply security and vary-
ing emphasis on the above elements lead to a very di-
verse set of instruments falling under the ‘CMs’ cate-
gory. The menu includes strategic reserves, capacity pay-
ments, capacity auctions, capacity obligations or forward
capacity options. These can be volume- or price-based,
centralised or decentralised, market-wide or technology-
specific (Agency for the Cooperation of the Energy Regu-
lators [ACER], 2013; Linklaters, 2014).
The lack of agreement on the instruments and de-
gree of capacity support, or on the very need to in-
troduce them, creates challenges for the IEM. In 2016,
the Commission found as many as 28 different CMs in
just 11 Member States, all potentially distorting mar-
ket harmony, while many were designed without assess-
ing whether security of supply was in fact threatened
(Commission, 2016a). It also highlights the perennial ten-
sion between harmonised EU energy governance and
maintaining national sovereignty over energy policy and
mixes. It is therefore interesting to understand the re-
cent Europeanisation of themost comprehensive kind of
market-wide CMs, that is capacity markets. What argu-
ments do governments use to justify capacity markets?
In what ways and to what extent has the Commission in-
fluenced national capacity market design, and has hori-
zontal learning occurred between Member States?
To respond to these questions, we analyse the UK,
France and Poland. The UK and France were among the
first to discuss the need for CMs. However, they have ar-
rived at two very different solutions: a capacity market
based on centralised auctions in the UK, and a decen-
tralised system based on a capacity obligation in France.
Poland joined the discussions later and had the opportu-
nity to learn from other Member States’ experiences.
We seek to contribute to a still little-developed liter-
ature on CMs with a comparative case study. As the pol-
icy studies literature on CMs is only just emerging, there
is a need for descriptive work to build foundations for
more explanatory analyses. The comparative case study
allows us to investigate how Member States justify the
need for CMs, and what policy options they consider at
different points in time. Problems related to the evolu-
tion of national CMs are better understood in terms of
a ‘what’ question than the search for a conclusive an-
swer to a ‘why’ questionwhichmight be futile, given that
there is always a complex of causal factors behind it. We
therefore focus on what factors influence the evolution
of CMs.
We first lay out our theoretical framework for study-
ing Commission–Member State relations in energy policy
development, and our research method. We then sketch
the existing EU policies for capacity and resource ade-
quacy, before describing the policy debate over CMs in
the three countries. Finally, we discuss the findings and
conclude that the Commission has been successful in
steering the policy debate by standardising supply secu-
rity assessment methodology and narrowing down the
set of available options, bymeans of State Aid Guidelines,
while horizontal learning among Member States seems
to be causing convergence on three types of CMs.
2. Theory and Method
To theorise the influence of the Commission onMember
State energy policy decisions, we draw on the concept of
Europeanisation. Europeanisation has been employed in
many different ways. Olsen (2002) mentions five ‘faces’,
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 92–104 93
where one refers to domestic impacts of European-
level institutions. Traditionally Europeanisation has been
treated in this way: as an output at national level caused
by European integration (e.g. Goetz & Meyer-Sahling,
2008). However, newer contributions hold that the EU
can no longer be understood as an external force, but as
one level within amulti-level system that includes EU, na-
tional and subnational levels (Trondal, 2017). In line with
this, we acknowledge that EU andnational-level decision-
making is embedded in a common European political or-
der. Given tensions between the levels, it is still of inter-
est to understand to what extent policy development is
driven by domestic factors and towhat extent the EU has
influenced policy-making. For such exploration, we dis-
tinguish between ‘vertical’ influence between EU institu-
tions and Member States (here: top-down influence of
the Commission), and ‘horizontal’ Europeanisation, en-
compassing different ways in which Member States in-
fluence each other.
In top-down Europeanisation we expect to see co-
ercive adaptive pressures, as EU legislation prescribes
certain requirements with which Member States have
to comply (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). Coercive pressures
constrain domestic policymaking not necessarily directly
via EU law, but also due to legal uncertainty arising
from the EU’s market-making policies (Schmidt, 2008).
Legal uncertainty may change opportunity structures
and make national actors change their plans for policy-
making (Töller, 2010). State Aid Guidelines are one ex-
amplewhere the Commission, given its far-reaching com-
petence to ban certain activities, negotiates with Mem-
ber States rather than adopting formal decisions (Töller,
2010). CMs have significant implications for competition
in the IEM. Many involve state aid, so are subject to cor-
responding EU rules. It can therefore be expected that
vertical coercive pressures from the Commission, with
its avowed aim to ensure a level playing field in the in-
ternal market, push the development of national CMs to-
wards harmonisation (ideally a single design acrossMem-
ber States).
Horizontal Europeanisation is typically characterised
by voluntary policy diffusion, most importantly learning
(Ladrech, 1994). The voluntary aspectmakes itmore diffi-
cult to find evidence that Europeanisation is actually tak-
ing place (Radaelli, 2003). To qualify as Europeanisation,
policy transfer has to emerge through EU policy or Eu-
ropean integration processes and not simply be transfer
acrossMember States (Howell, 2004). Because factors at
the EU and national levels interact, there is a need to
carefully study national energy policy debates and focus
onMember States’ justifications for introducing CMs. For
example, if referring to experiences in other countries,
are such references inspired by EU discussions or sim-
ply a wish to learn from other countries’ practices? We
trace the influence of vertical and horizontal Europeani-
sationmechanisms on capacitymarket design, observing
the divergence from initial proposals to the actual poli-
cies introduced, and considering when policies were dis-
cussed nationally and when EU institutions addressed re-
lated ideas.
Out of the four Member States which currently have
capacity markets in place (chronologically: UK, France,
Italy and Poland), we analyse the policy debates in three:
the UK, France and Poland. The first two have developed
quite distinct approaches to resource adequacy, while
the third opted for introducing a capacity market only af-
ter 2016, and faced a different approach from the Com-
mission as well as opportunities to learn from the former
two. Among the eleven Member States studied by the
Commission in 2016, Poland and France have the low-
est increase in renewable electricity shares (Commission,
2016c). This is interesting because the increase in renew-
ables tends to be perceived as a key reason to introduce
CMs. In contrast, the UK achieved a significant increase
in renewable electricity. At the same time France and
Poland are among the countries that rely the most on
combustible fuels (Poland) or nuclear (France), while the
UK has decreased reliance on coal considerably but is in-
vesting heavily in nuclear. These differences and similar-
ities make these countries interesting for a study of the
development of their different CMs.
The analysis builds on qualitative data, including, pol-
icy papers and official communication, consultancy re-
ports, secondary literature and newspaper articles as
well as, in the British case, information from six anony-
mous, semi-structured face-to-face interviews with one
politician, twoNGOs, two civil servants and one policy ad-
visor carried out from 2016 to 2017. The interviews have
provided data about perceptions, ideas and negotiation
processes, which is otherwise difficult to access. We use
this data to reconstruct the national debates and Mem-
ber State-Commission negotiations of CM designs, focus-
ing on the changes in options considered, justifications
given for specific instruments and explicit references to
transnational influence.
3. EU Policies for Capacity Adequacy Regulations
At the EU level, Electricity Directives from 2003 and 2009
regulate CMs, focusing on the need to attract funding
and secure investments that otherwise would not have
been implemented (González-Diaz, 2015). EU climate
policy has also affected the perceived need for adequacy
provision. The EU 2020 and 2030 renewable energy tar-
gets aswell as the Renewable Energy Directive 2009 have
required Member States to support renewable electric-
ity, making conventional capacity potentially important
as a back-up for intermittent solar and wind power.
Since CMs have an impact on competition, many will
qualify as state aids under Article 107(1) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the EU and be subject to corre-
sponding rules. In the Guidelines on State Aid for Envi-
ronmental Protection and Energy (2014–2020), the Com-
mission acknowledges that Member States may need to
introduce CMs to assure a sufficient level of power gen-
eration. However, it also points out that: Member States
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 92–104 94
must define the CMclearly; competitionmust be assured
in the allocation of support; and different technologies
and alternative solutions should participate in compe-
tition (e.g., demand-side management, cables and stor-
age technologies).
In the past, the Commission has been adamant that
its energy-only ‘Target Electricity Model’ would be suf-
ficient to deliver reliability (Newbery, 2015), without
the need for separate arrangements to ensure capacity
availability. The Directorate General for Competition (DG
COMP) has been critical of capacity payments, arguing
that they ‘often havemore to do with compensating gen-
erators for stranded assets than delivering reliability at
least cost’ (Newbery, 2015, p. 2). In its interim report of
the sector inquiry on CMs, the Commission (2016a) ex-
presses concerns that capacity markets may favour par-
ticular producers and technologies unduly and that they
create electricity trade obstacles across borders, distort-
ing cross-border electricity trade and competition.
4. National Capacity Markets
Despite the Commission’s concerns, a large number of
Member States has introduced different kinds of CMs,
and four Member States now have market-wide CMs.
In an energy-only market, prices should reflect demand
and supply of energy. When there is a tightening sup-
ply, prices rise and this should reduce demand, but since
energy demand is often not very elastic this may lead
to severe consequences, possibly even a blackout. Ex-
tremely high energy prices and fears of blackouts are po-
litically unacceptable. Therefore, Member States prefer
to intervene in the energy market, introducing CMs for
the purpose of reducing the frequency and level of price
spikes (ACER, 2013), and making sure that there exists
a safety margin in generation capacity in case of unex-
pected events. As a result, several Member States have
opted for reforming their energy markets from energy-
only to energy-and-capacity markets, citing future invest-
ment gaps and possible capacity adequacy issues.
4.1. The United Kingdom
Until 2014, the UK relied on an energy-only market to de-
liver sufficient capacity. The government introduced the
country’s first explicit CM as part of a wider Electricity
Market Reform package, proposed in 2010 and adopted
in the Energy Act 2013 and the Electricity Capacity Reg-
ulations 2014. The adopted Capacity Market instrument
is a centralised capacity auction system, where genera-
tors compete for long-term contracts that define the pay-
ment for the capacity thatmust be delivered in the event
of system stress during a defined ‘delivery period’.
In terms of the need for a mechanism in principle,
the government was persuaded by arguments based on
the ‘missing money problem’. Around a quarter of ex-
isting capacity—mainly coal and nuclear stations—was
expected to close by 2020, to be replaced by new, low-
carbon generation. However, the Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC) calculated that ‘de-rated’ ca-
pacity margins could potentially fall, increasing the likeli-
hood of ‘blackouts’. Greater intermittency in generation
and inflexibility compounded concerns about security
of supply (DECC, 2010). A new instrument was deemed
necessary, to deliver value for money and security of
supply, while ensuring coherence with decarbonisation
goals (DECC, 2014a). Later ministerial announcements
made it clear that delivering new gas capacity was also
expected (Orme, 2016).
As part of the policy-making process, DECC and its
consultants considered the four main options: a capacity
payment, a decentralised capacity obligation, an auction-
based capacity market and a targeted strategic reserve.
DECC’s initial preference was for setting volume rather
than price centrally (Bolton & Claussen, 2017). Of the
two volume-based mechanisms, the strategic reserve or
market-wide auctions, DECC initially indicated a prefer-
ence for the former. Under a targeted mechanism, pay-
ments are made only to those generators that provide
the additional capacity needed to make up any antic-
ipated shortfall, rather than paying all generators the
same. DECC predicted that a targeted mechanism would
result in greater investment in new gas plants (Bolton &
Claussen, 2017).
Responses were mixed. Many existing generators op-
posed a targeted mechanism (ECC Select Committee,
2011, p. 51), expressing concern about a ‘slippery slope’
effect, whereby remaining within the targeted subset of
capacity receiving the payment becomes more attrac-
tive than remaining in the market, thus undermining the
energy-only market further. This was deemed likely to ex-
acerbate the ‘missingmoney’ problem. Others, including
RWE and EON, were sceptical of the need for capacity
payments at all (Lockwood, 2017, p. 47). The majority of
the Big Six were in favour (ibid).
A further concern underlay the government’s shift
in favour of a market-wide auctioning mechanism. New
calculations taking into account the effects of plant clo-
sures and increasing amounts of low-carbon generation
indicated that de-rated capacity margins could fall to be-
low 5% in some years, by the early to mid-2020s. At the
end of the consultation process, a capacity market was
eventually justified as the preferred option as ‘it best ad-
dresses the market failures and is robust to a range of
scenarios. It should also reduce regulatory and market
risks for investors’ (DECC, 2011, p. 1).
Critics pointed to how the emerging policy strongly
favoured industry incumbents, and highlighted how the
DECC teamworking on the reformhad been boosted by a
significant number of staff seconded from the Big Six en-
ergy companies (Carrington, 2012). Critics of the capacity
market, including independent analysts and NGOs, also
highlighted the role of National Grid, whose financial in-
centive to connect more capacity to the grid arguably in-
fluenced the methodological assumptions it adopts (in-
terviews with one politician and two NGOs). In assess-
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ing future security of supply and advising on the amount
of capacity to be procured, National Grid made conser-
vative assumptions regarding generation availability and
the contribution to bemade by both interconnection and
demand-side response (Baker, Bayer, & Rączka, 2015;
Newbery, 2015). Although its detailed assessment recog-
nised that interconnection would likely contribute to se-
curity at times of peak demand, the amount of genera-
tion capacity to be procured for delivery in 2018/19 was
based on the assumption of a zero net contribution from
neighbouring systems, ‘at odds with the standard proba-
bilistic approach to security of supply’ (Baker et al., 2015).
While an independent Panel of Technical Experts de-
signed to advise on National Grid’s assessment was criti-
cal of its methods, and made a number of strong recom-
mendations, they were not taken up (Newbery, 2015).
In order to secure Commission state aids approval,
the UK agreed to enable interconnected capacity ex-
cluded from the first capacity auction to participate in
the second (Commission, 2014). That this appeared to
be the only condition imposed in a rapid DG COMP
approval process triggered controversy (Energy Post,
2014), including internally at the Commission (Energy
Post, 2016). Critics were disappointed that the Commis-
sion, though noting criticism from the likes of the UK
Panel of Technical Experts highlighting the likelihood of
over-procurement, gave the government the benefit of
the doubt. While the UK government cited the missing
money problem as one of the main market failures that
the Capacity Market would address, there were grounds
to believe that the problem would ease before the first
delivery year, by which time energy prices would more
fully reflect scarcity value thanks to reforms to the Bal-
ancing Market (Baker et al., 2015). A further issue arose
in that by not allowing demand-side-response providers
contract lengths longer than a year, while new power sta-
tions got 15 years, the dominance of fossil fuel gener-
ation would be strengthened, contrary to the State Aid
Guidelines. In principle, these issues might have justified
a ‘phase two’ state aids investigation. DG COMP’s deci-
sion generated suspicion that it was politically, rather
than legallymotivated. At a timewhen relations between
the UK and the Commission were already difficult owing
to the December 2013 decision (Davey, 2013) to launch a
‘phase two’ investigation into the Hinkley Point proposed
nuclear plant, ‘pre-Brexit when Europe still cared about
keeping UK on-side…I think they just gave them the ca-
pacity market’ (interview with one NGO).
For their part, UK civil servants portray the role of
the Commission as ‘very significant’, and the process of
securing state aids clearance ‘very onerous’, having ‘ma-
terial effects on the design’ (in interviews). Dialogue be-
tween the government and the Commission was inten-
sive (DECC, 2014b, p. 12), but interestingly coincided
with the discussions regarding the revision of state aid
guidelines. If clearance for the capacity market was facili-
tated by taking into account the likely content of the new
State Aid Guidelines in its design (interviews with two
civil servants and one policy advisor), it is also notewor-
thy that the revised guidelines are themselves in keep-
ing with the UK preference that capacity markets should
have a place in a reformed model of electricity market
regulation. A small flexibility services provider Tempus
Energy opened a legal challenge against the Commission
on grounds that it had violated the principles of non-
discrimination, proportionality and legitimate expecta-
tion and made a wrong assessment of the facts when
it approved the CM without a ‘phase two’ inquiry. In
November 2018, the Court of Justice of the EU (2018)
found in favour of Tempus’ challenge, ruling the CM ap-
proval to have been unlawful (Coyne, 2018). The ruling
could force the government to redesign the its policy,
offering more favourable terms to providers of demand-
side services, and resubmit it for state aid approval.
4.2. France
France faces several challenges that have made the gov-
ernment want to introduce a CM. Since the 1970s, nu-
clear has been a main electricity source, with little diver-
sity in the generationmix and the dominance of the oper-
ator Electricité de France (EDF). France relies heavily on
electric heating,which, since the endof the 1990s, has re-
sulted in regular consumption peaks during cold winter
periods, creating imbalance between demand and sup-
ply in the absence of storage capacity (Crevel-Sander &
Beaugonin, 2015). In 2010, the French transmission sys-
tem operator (Réseau de Transport d’Électricité [RTE])
published its annual assessment report, depicting an in-
creasingly alarming situation: risks to electricity supply
would increase and result in serious threats of energy
shortage as early as 2015–2016 (RTE, 2010). Managing
those peak situations is the main motivation for adopt-
ing a CM.
In the 2000s, the level of threat to security of supply
increased due to decommissioning of some thermal pro-
duction facilities and because of a ‘missing money’ prob-
lem due to a decrease in energy consumption after the
2008 financial crisis and the depreciation of the whole-
sale electricity price (RTE, 2017). The lack of investment
and profitability in new capacity worried electricity pro-
ducers, who informed public authorities of the difficul-
ties they faced. In addition, the increasing share of re-
newable energy in electricity generation started to af-
fect the energy system (intermittency) and market dy-
namics (competitiveness of sources able to contribute
to peak situations) (Desessard, 2012). Between Novem-
ber 2012 andNovember 2013, renewable energy produc-
tion grew by more than 33%, due to advantageous sup-
port measures.
These conditions, and the absence of a mechanism
to develop demand response, prompted discussions on
security of supply at the national level. The government’s
immediate reaction was to adopt, in 2009, a new multi-
year plan of investment to define short term objectives.
It established a working group to study the consump-
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tion peak phenomenon andmake proposals on how best
to manage peaks. The working group concluded that an
energy-only market could not alone deliver the neces-
sary solutions and proposed a CMconsisting of a capacity
obligation on all suppliers along with a certificate market
(Poignant-Sido Report, 2010). As the problem applies to
the whole territory, the mechanism was recommended
to be nationwide and, in order to involve all actors and
capacity, it should be decentralised (with one exception
for a new gas-fired power plant in Brittany) (Commission,
2017). Under a decentralised model, the responsibility
for adequacy between the supply offered and the de-
mand from the customers is born by actors like suppli-
ers (and is therefore decentralised), while under a cen-
tralised system, it is usually the transmission system op-
erator who is in charge of making the assessment for
the other actors, bearing the responsibility for security
of supply almost alone (therefore centralised). Both the
Poignant-Sido Report and the parliamentary debates dur-
ing the adoption of this law refer to foreign experiences
with CMs in Europe and the United States, as a source of
inspiration and comparison.
Shortly after the report’s publication, the principle
of a capacity obligation mechanism was enshrined in
the Electricity Market Reform Law adopted in December
2010. The CM took the form of a decentralised obliga-
tion promoting both generation capacity and demand re-
sponse. Electricity suppliers are required to hold a cer-
tain amount of capacity guarantees, determined by the
transmission system operator in proportion to the elec-
tricity consumption of their consumers in peak periods
in the four coming years. All operators of generation
capacity and/or demand response are required to cer-
tify all of their capacity through a contract to be agreed
with the transmission system operator, who issues the
guarantees. To meet their obligation, the suppliers have
to secure capacity guarantees by relying on their own
means or by acquiring them from others. The design of
the mechanism has been subject to much debate and
took several years to agree on. Once set at national level,
it was quickly brought into consistency with EU law and
the Commission’s requests, before the Commission ap-
proved it in November 2016, with 2017 as the first deliv-
ery year.
In order to implement the new mechanism, the Min-
istry in charge of energy and industry tasked the trans-
mission system operator with elaborating detailed rules.
RTE’s report was subject to consultation and intense dis-
cussions: The Union of the French electricity industry
was concerned about the equity of the system, arguing in
favour of sharing amongst suppliers the burden of what
they argued amounted to a public service obligation. The
electricity-intensive industry and aggregators defended
the valorisation of demand response. In its report, the
transmission system operator defended a decentralised
mechanism (RTE, 2011). Although a decentralisedmodel
in theory advantages new market entrants, alternative
suppliers were concerned that a decentralised model
would in practice favour EDF, and proposed a centralised
bidding process based on investment projects. Being a
dominant electricity producer, EDF could benefit from
its position on the generation market and distort compe-
tition on the capacity obligations market. The transmis-
sion systemoperator rejected the latter proposal. The im-
plementation decree (adopted in December 2012) con-
firmed the decentralised model and a market-based ap-
proach relying on a tradable certificates scheme (i.e., ca-
pacity obligations).
How to further implement the new capacity mech-
anism was again subject to consultation between
2012–2014. The national regulatory authority (CRE) and
the national competition authority came with a series of
critical comments, questioning the extent to which the
mechanism contributes to security of supply, the lack
of impact assessment, the additional costs for final cus-
tomers, risks of distortion of competition on the envis-
aged capacity due to the dominant role of EDF and the
fear that EDF could benefit from all the capacity pay-
ments (CRE, 2012). However, the Ministry in charge fi-
nally approved the rules on 22 January 2015.
The legislative basis for this mechanism has been
challenged before national and EU courts, although the
procedures are now closed (Banet, 2016). The applicant
before national courts was the national association of al-
ternative retail energy providers, which argued that the
mechanism would automatically put EDF in a position to
abuse its dominant position.
The initial stance of the French government was that
the CM does not constitute state aid, and therefore not
a matter for the Commission. The logic behind this was
that a broad-based capacitymechanism that includes de-
mand side response (DSR) and is backed by the market
should qualify as a public service obligation (in relation to
security of energy supply) and not as state aid (Linklaters,
2014, p. 13).
Nevertheless, the mechanism has been under the
scrutiny of the Commission, both as part of the sector
inquiry and an individual state aid case (SA.39621). DG
COMP raised several questions as to its compatibility
with the State Aid Guidelines. After intense negotiations
between the French government and DG COMP, and the
resulting adoption of some amendments, the French ca-
pacity market mechanism was deemed compatible with
EU rules and duly authorised. The dialoguewith the Com-
mission services also involved the Directorate-General
for Energy (DG ENER), whose signals were not always
in line with DG COMP’s (Marty & Reverdy, 2017). DG
ENER was in the phase of finalising its proposal for the
Clean Energy Package and preparing for a further step
in the liberalisation of IEM (Commission, 2016b). DG
ENER therefore saw some value in more temporary and
targeted mechanisms, targeting plants to be decommis-
sioned (Commission, 2016c).
The French minister argued that the approval deci-
sion required ‘intense work between the Commission
and the French authorities’ (Actu Environnement, 2016).
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Three key amendments were made, resulting in more
stringent public control of the mechanism than the
French government originally foresaw: one amendment
opened the national mechanism to cross-border capac-
ity from the delivery year 2019; another improved trans-
parency in order to prevent distortion of competition re-
sulting from the position of EDF; a third addressed the
feared lack of signals for new investments by providing
for an additional incentive through the conclusion ofmul-
tiannual contracts between RTE and new capacity oper-
ators at a fixed price for seven years, following a bid-
ding process.
4.3. Poland
Poland’s electricity market has for years been energy-
only; however, due to problems with adequacy, reliabil-
ity of the system, and investment instability, there has—
since 2009—been a discussion about introducing addi-
tional capacity payments (Sadowska, 2015). First capac-
ity measures were introduced in 2013–14 and included
a targeted reserve, where the transmission system op-
erator pays selected energy producers to keep their ca-
pacity ready for use in case of a sudden shift in the sys-
tem. The first contract for a ‘cold reserve’ was signed
in 2014 (PAP, 2014). At the same time an operating ca-
pacity reserve was introduced, and the transmission sys-
tem operator started organising demand-side response
tenders (Sadowska, 2015). An independent energy think
tank pointed out that the ‘cold reserve’, which pays a pre-
mium to plants which also participate in the regular and
balancingmarkets, is in fact a capacity payment and state
aid (Chojnacki, 2016).
Increasingly, however, the debate in Poland focused
on possible supply shortages in near future as fossil
plants were being decommissioned (due to their age
and the strict EU industrial emissions regulations). Al-
though improved prognoses on capacity adequacy have
decreased the urgency of such measures for the trans-
mission systemoperator, once the ideawas put on the ta-
ble, it was picked up by the incumbents. Energy industry
organisations commissioned E&Y consultancy to develop
a proposal for a capacity market, which it submitted to
the Ministry of Economy and the regulator in Novem-
ber 2014. The proposal displayed awareness of the con-
straints imposed by 2014 EU State Aid Guidelines, and
developed two options, drawing on the two existing Eu-
ropean CMs: the UK centralised capacity auction model
and the French decentralised capacity obligation model
(Sadowska, 2015).
The Civic Platform (PO) government (2007–2015) re-
sisted these postulates, fearing a hike in energy prices.
However, as the Commission was already looking at Eu-
ropean CMs, and inquiring into the Polish cold and opera-
tional reserves, the government suggested that amarket-
wide capacity mechanism could be created and called a
‘decarbonisation reserve’. That was meant to frame it in
climate-friendly terms, even though themain goal would
be to keep coal plants online and support vertically inte-
grated mining/energy conglomerates (Zasuń, 2015).
In 2016, the new Ministry of Energy in the Law and
Justice (PiS) government proposed a framework for a
market-wide capacity mechanism, modelled on the UK
capacity auctions. This initiative came in the context of
the newly introduced Renewable Energy Law, which re-
placed green certificates (quota) with volume-restricted
feed in tariff tenders for specific technologies (based on
auctions) (Szulecki, 2017). As a result, some of Poland’s
oldest coal plants, which benefited from green certifi-
cates from biomass co-firing, faced potential economic
problems, while the age of the entire plant fleet called
for phase-out or rapid retrofit.
The dual goal of the energy sector and the govern-
ment was to secure funding for extending the life (mod-
ernising) of numerous baseload coal plants, as well as im-
proving the economic rationale for their functioning (sub-
sidising). Poland pre-notified the Commission in Novem-
ber 2016 and sent the full draft of the proposed CM leg-
islation in December. All capacity over 2MW was to be
subject to certification and allowed to take part in ca-
pacity auctions (Zasuń & Derski, 2016). The transmission
system operator would then project the volume needed
in a given year, the Minister of Energy would design the
tenders while a ‘capacity fee’ to finance the mechanism
would be set by the national regulator and added to elec-
tricity bills of final consumer—industrial and household.
The project omitted two important guidelines which
the Commission issued earlier or at the same time. Fol-
lowing the initial report byDGCOMPand thework on the
Clean Energy Package, in November 2016, the Commis-
sion proposed that in future CMs, most carbon intensive
generation (above 550 kg/MWh) should be excluded,
which effectively bans coal plants from CMs (Neslen,
2016). The Polish project also did not initially envision ca-
pacity in neighbouring countries and interconnectors to
be part of the system. Consultations between Poland and
DG COMP took place between January 2017 and January
2018 (with 14 meetings and teleconferences) (Commis-
sion, 2018).
The Commission agreed with Poland’s arguments,
most importantly the demonstration of the missing
money market failure, though the national transmission
system operator was asked to conduct a modelling ex-
ercise based on a methodology approved by the Euro-
peanNetwork of Transmission SystemOperators for Elec-
tricity (the Mid-term Adequacy Forecast), which indeed
showed that lack of investmentswill lead to considerable
scarcities. In the process, the Commission emphasised
that significant parts of the missing money problem can
be dealt with by adjusting price signals on the existing en-
ergy market, without the need of state aid–and obliged
Poland to introduce important reforms in the balancing
market, making it more flexible and adding mechanisms
targeting scarcity, including demand-side response.
The delay in introducing a CM allowed Poland to
learn from the experience of other EU members, most
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importantly the UK. To avoid some apparent mistakes,
Polish legislators came upwith the idea of three ‘capacity
baskets’ in auctions: for existing, modernised, and newly
constructed capacity. However, the Commission, appar-
ently seeing the UK model of technologically neutral
market-wide auctions as a preferred mold for new CM
legislation (legal challenge notwithstanding), opposed
the idea of baskets, and in October 2017 Poland’s Energy
Ministry offered an amended proposal which did not in-
clude these. Energy experts agreed that without an addi-
tional mechanism boosting investment in new capacity,
the ‘UKmodel’ applied to Polandwould only result in sub-
sidising the modernisation of the 1950s/60s coal plants
(Wysokie Napięcie, 2017).
The bill was passed on 8 December 2017 (the Capac-
ity Market Law), with a final acceptance from the Com-
mission in February 2018. By the first year of capacity
delivery (2021) Poland is obliged to phase out all other
capacity payments. The introduction of energy storages
(potentially allowing renewables to enter the capacity
market through the back door), as well as a premium for
co-generation (power and heat), was welcomed bymore
green-minded experts. However,Maćkowiak-Padera and
Swierczynski (2018) point out that the capacity mar-
ket will initially only petrify the existing four-company
oligopoly, and that without decarbonisation measures
and better renewables support, the CM alonewill not de-
liver any emissions reductions, making Poland’s chances
to reach its 2030 climate targets dubious.
Importantly, as the final justification published by the
Commission in April 2018 shows, the final Capacity Mar-
ket Law will have to be significantly reformed to reflect
the compromise reached betweenWarsaw and Brussels.
This includes necessary reforms of the balancing market,
aimed at minimising the need for capacity subsidies. The
rule that all other investment support and aid are de-
duced from capacity payments is even more important
for the Polish energy sector as this includes free emission
allowances in the European Trading System, translating
tomillions of Polish zlotys (Wysokie Napięcie, 2018). One
last point is the increased role for cross-border capacities
(through interconnectors), which have been assigned a
larger share in the capacity market than the Polish au-
thorities intended.
Table 1 summarises key characteristics of the CMs in
the three countries.
5. Discussion
In all three countries the missing money issue was more
frequently cited as justification for introducing CMs than
supply irregularities caused by an increasing share of re-
newables. In the UK, lack of willingness to invest has
been the most important reason, though the capacity
market failed to incentivise new gas capacity. The instru-
ment has been heavily criticised for decreasing opportu-
nities for renewable energy through generous support of
fossil-fueled power.
France introduced capacity obligations primarily be-
cause of the high load in winter due to heavy reliance
on electric heating and lack of investment in particular
following the decrease in energy consumption following
the 2008 financial crisis. France is unique in that decen-
tralised capacity assurance is clearly aimed at system
stability, and in consequence, demand-side response
plays a crucial role, as it provides flexibility to a nuclear-
based system.
The initial concern in Poland was the risk of future
power shortages due to decommissioning of fossil plants.
However, the ‘missing money’ problem for modernisa-
tion (retrofit) and additional investment in for example,
gas generation, became quickly conflated with calls for
subsidising coal-based generation.
When it comes to stakeholders, the Big Six UK utilities
had considerable influence on instrument design. Four
of them favoured a market-wide centralised auction sys-
tem and appear to have been particularly influential on
the government department responsible. Similarly, the
large public utilities in Poland had great influence on the
design of the Polish capacity market. To some extent this
case is akin to regulatory capture. The primary reason for
introducing a capacity market in Poland was to provide
an additional source of income for large utilities, to help
coal-fired power plants compete with producers of re-
newable energy and to avoid power shortages. In France
too, the design of the CM favours the dominant utility.
In terms of our theoretical expectations,we expected
vertical Europeanisation to put the Member States un-
Table 1. CMs in the UK, France and Poland.
The UK France Poland
What? Centralised capacity auctions Decentralised capacity obligation Centralised capacity auctions
When?
First decision 2010 2010 2014
Implemented 2014 2016 2018
Why?
Key reason Missing money High winter load, missing money Missing money
Other reason Renewable policy Renewable policy Support utilities
Relation to the EU Vertical Vertical Vertical and horizontal
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der coercive pressures and that State Aid Guidelines in
particular would push the development of national CMs
towards harmonised cooperation. We find that the Com-
mission has enforced some harmonisation–albeit not in
the direction that CM critics were hoping for. In the UK
case, the Commission was lenient in granting state aid
although the Commission did enforce greater considera-
tion of interconnected capacity, originally excluded from
the auctions. However, critics of Commission leniency
have been vindicated by the recent, highly consequential
ruling of the General Court to annul the 2014 approval.
We should also be reminded that the emergence of UK’s
auction-based mechanism coincided with growing calls
for auctioning as a way to determine renewable energy
support in some countries (e.g. Germany and Poland). It
should not comeas a surprise that the Commission opted
for centralised auctioning in capacity markets as well, ar-
guably achieving some harmonisation.
As with the UK, intensive negotiations also charac-
terise the relationship between France and the Commis-
sion. France intended to adopt an instrument in line
with EU law, choosing a market-based and -wide, de-
centralised, technology-neutral scheme, and hoped to
avoid DG COMP inquiry altogether. However, there were
doubts about the compatibility with the State Aid Guide-
lines and the French authorities were forced to re-design
several elements of the CM, including: opening the na-
tional mechanism to cross-border capacity; improving
transparency to prevent distortion of competition by
EDF; and an additional incentive for investments through
multiannual contracts between transmission system op-
erator and new capacity operators based on competi-
tive rounds.
Poland had to agree, in view of the 2016 Clean En-
ergy Package, that future CM auctions would exclude the
most carbon intensive forms of generation, effectively
ruling out support to coal plants. The Polish authorities
also had to integrate capacity in neighbouring countries
and interconnectors in its system, abandon its idea of
having separate auctions for existing, modernised and
newly constructed capacity, and open the system up for
storage and demand-side response providers. The Pol-
ish case is interesting, as due to the timing of the proce-
dure, its CM design has been subjected tometiculous DG
COMP inquiry, visibly informed not only by the State Aid
Guidelines, but also lessons from the UK case, horizontal
learning linked to the Clean Energy Package proposals, as
well as a more clearly articulated Commission stance.
6. Conclusions and Outlook
The evidence shows that while the Commission encour-
ages cross-border solutions, the UK, France and Poland
have prioritised national CMs and developed them with
domestic interests in mind. While the Commission seeks
to minimise the use of CMs, risk-averse Member States
exaggerate the actual need for capacity support to be on
the ‘safe side’, notwithstanding the distorting effects on
the IEM. However, in terms of vertical Europeanisation,
the Commission has strong tools to affect the Member
States’ CMs: it has initiated state aid inquiries into such
mechanisms. The UK, France and Poland have had inten-
sive negotiationswith the Commission and have adopted
their designs more or less in alignment with the State
Aid Guidelines (at least as interpreted at the time by DG
COMP). That said, the development of CMs has largely
been domestically driven in all the three countries. The
developments have mostly been voluntary and are char-
acterised by horizontal learning from other countries, in
particular in the Polish case, where Polish authorities—
under the pressure from the Commission—have looked
at the experiences in other countries when changing
their CM.
Critics of CMs express disillusionment that the Com-
mission has not been ‘tougher’, but essentially allowed
incumbent (often fossil fuel dominated) companies to be
supported with taxpayers’ cash, which would be better
spent on clean renewables. However, the Commission
has managed to achieve harmonisation in three impor-
tant respects. First, as many CMs encompass state aid,
Member States have to be clear about their purpose and
follow certain standards (i.e. methodology), when calcu-
lating future supply security risks (Geysens, 2017, p. 119).
Second, CMs are required to feature elements like cross-
border capacity through interconnectors, demand-side
response and competitive bidding. The Tempus court
ruling, which may force the UK to make its CM more
favourable to providers of demand-side services, shows
that even in cases where the Commission is lenient, na-
tional authorities may still be forced to go further than
theywant to, as other actorsmay initiate legal challenges.
Moreover, the Commission might use this power more
fully now that the Court has ruled that DG Comp was
not strict enough in applying the State Aid Guidelines
in the UK case. Finally, the February 2018 round of ap-
provals of certain Member States’ CMs by the Commis-
sion shows that there are primarily three EU CM options:
capacity markets (in the centralised auction ‘UK’ and de-
centralised obligation ‘French’ model), demand-side re-
sponse schemes and strategic reserves. A fundamental
cleavage seems to run between targeted strategic re-
serves (aimed at securing backup for intermittent renew-
ables) and–what we have focused on in our analysis–
market-wide mechanisms. While the former is aimed at
securing backup for intermittent renewables, our study
suggests that the latter focus on missing money.
To conclude, although the increasing share of renew-
ables has changed the perception of CMs from the miss-
ing money problem to a back-up for intermittent elec-
tricity, the UK, France and Poland have introduced CMs
chiefly because of lack of investment. However, increas-
ing shares of irregular electricity will increase pressure
for more back-up solutions. The Commission is likely to
continue to use its power, promoting cross-country so-
lutions, and Member States are increasingly investing
in interconnectors. Moreover, the Commission suggests
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that in future the EU’s market design ‘should not be
too prescriptive’, as different tools are intended to ‘fit
the situation of a particular member state or market’
(Euractiv, 2018).
The interplay between targeted and market-wide
CMs will be important over the next several years. New
research should focus on how preferences for either
are formed in relation to both the characteristics of na-
tional energy systems and domestic political discussions
around energy and decarbonisation.
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